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OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD
1998 WL 129931 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1998)1
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Eugene Woodard was sentenced to death for aggravated
murder committed in the course of a carjacking.2 Woodard's
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.3 As
Woodard's execution date approached, the Ohio Adult
Parole Authority (the "Authority") began its clemency inves-
tigation.4 TheAuthority informedWoodard that his clemency
interview would be held on September 9,1994 and that his
clemency hearing would be on September 14,1994.'
Woodard objected to two aspects of the clemency
process. First, he objected to the short notice of the interview
and hearing. Second, he objected to the fact that his attorney
could not attend the clemency interview.6 When theAuthority
failed to respond to these objections, Woodard filed suit in
United States District Court alleging that Ohio's clemency
process violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due
Process of law.7 The district court granted the State's Rule
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.8
'This case was released just days before the publication of this vol-
ume of the Capital DefenseJoumal.Because of its potential significance
to counsel in capital cases, we have included this limited summary of
the case. This case will eventually be reported at 118 S.Ct. 1244.
2Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, No. 96-1769, 1998
WL 129931, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1998).
3Woodard, 1998 WL 129931, at *4 (citing State v. Woodard,
623 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246 (1994)).
4Iad Under Ohio law, when an inmate is under a death sentence
theAuthority is required to conduct a clemency hearing with 45 days
of the scheduled execution date. IdL at *3 (citing Ohio Rev. Code §
2967.07 (1993)). Prior to the clemency hearing, the inmate may
request a clemency interview with the parole board.Id.The inmate is
not allowed to have counsel at the clemency interview unless special
permission is granted.Following the clemency interview and hearing,
the Authority must complete its review and make a recommendation
to the Govemor. Il The ultimate power to grant clemency, however,
rests solely with the Govemor. d (citing Omo CoNST., art. 3, § 2).
51d. at *4.
6Woodard, 1998 WL 129931, at *4.
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1d Woodard also alleged that his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent was violated by the clemency interview. Woodard
argued that by affording him a voluntary clemency interview, which
was conducted without counsel or a grant of use immunity, the state
was forcing him to choose between asserting his privilege against
self-incrimination and participating in the clemency review process.
Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed and reasoned that this
"Hobson's choice" might render the Ohio clemency process uncon-
stitutional. Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authoriy 107 E3d 1178,
1189 (6th Cir. 1997).The Supreme Court reversed. OhioAdult Parole
Authority v.Woodard, No.96-1769,1998WL 129931,at *10 (U.S.Mar.
25,1998). Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a unanimous Court, reasoned
that Woodard "ha[d] the ... choice of providing information to the
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In regard to
Woodard's due process argument, the court of appeals held that
Woodard had "original" life and liberty interests before trial and
also at each subsequent proceeding which were protected by
the Due Process ClauseThe amount of process due at each sub-
sequent proceeding, however, "was in proportion to the degree
to which the [proceeding] was an 'integral part' of the trial
process" 0 The court of appeals reasoned that because clemency
was so far removed from trial, the process due could be minimal.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and held that "the Due Process Clause [was
not] violated by Ohio's clemency proceedings."'
Although the Court was nearly unanimous in its judgment,
it was sharply split on the broader question of what, if any,
process is due to inmates during clemency proceedings. Chief
Justice Rehnquist characterized a death row inmate's clemency
petition as a "unilateral hope" which is not subject to Due
Process protection. 2 He reasoned that the "Due Process Clause
is not violated where, as here, the procedures in question do no
more than confirm that the clemency ... power is committed,
as is our tradition, to the authority of the executive" 3
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, believed that
"some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency
proceedings" 4 Similarly, Justice Stevens concluded that the
Authority - at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for post-
conviction relief - or of remaining silent. But this pressure to speak
in the hope of being granted clemency does not make the interview
compelled" within the meaning of the FifthAmendment.Id.
8Woodard, 1998WL 129931, at * 4.
91d. at *5. Subsequent proceedings include discretionary
appeals, post-conviction proceedings, and clemency proceedings.
'0Id. (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,393 (1985)).
"1id. at *10.The judgment of the Court on this point was 8-1
with Justice Stevens as the lone dissenter.
'"Woodard, 1998 WL 129931, at *6.The Chief Justice's opin-
ion on this point was only joined by Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. It does not constitute the opinion
of the Court.
11Id. at *3.
"Id. at *10 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part & concurring in
the judgment).Justice SouterJustice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice O'Connor concluded
that Ohio's clemency procedures, which require a clemency
investigation by the State and guarantee the inmate notice and an
opportunity to be heard, were sufficient to meet the "minimal"
requirements of Due Process. Id. at *11 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part & concurring in the judgment).
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Due Process Clause requires some "minimal requirements"
in clemency proceedings.'5 Thus, five of the nine justices
agreed that Due Process does require some minimal
procedural safeguards in clemency proceedings.
ANAIYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Because the Court did not define what clemency proce-
dures would satisfy Due Process, the application of the decision
toVirginia is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
majority of the Court found the Ohio clemency procedures suf-
ficient. It is equally clear that in some important respects, the
procedure in Vrginia provides far fewer protections.Thus, capi-
tal counsel may argue that theVirginia procedure is insufficient.
Specifically, Virginia's clemency procedures differ from
Ohio's in two important respects.' 6 First, the Virginia Parole
Board ("VPB") is not required to conduct a clemency investi-
gation in every case." Rather, it is only required to do so"at the
request of the Governor.""8 VPB may, however, conduct a
clemency investigation on its own initiative in any other case
in which it is "proper or in the best interest of the
Commonwealth" to do so.'" Counsel may be able to argue that
a discretionary clemency investigation is insufficient to satisfy
the minimum requirements of due process. Such unfettered
151d. at *11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens concluded that the case should be
remanded to the District Court to consider whether Ohio's pro-
cedures meet the minimum standards of Due Process.
'6See Va. Const. art. 5, §12 &Va. Code §§ 53.1-229 to 53.1-231
(1994).
'WA. CODE § 53.1-231 (1994).
1id.
19Id.
'In Woodar4 Justice O'Connor stated that"[jludicial intervention
might... be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official
flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case
where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency
discretion could lead to grants of clemency which are based
on some constitutionally impermissible factor or procedure.2"
Second,Virginia's clemency procedures do not guarantee
an inmate any notice or hearing. Notice and an opportunity to
be heard are two of the most ftmdamental requirements of due
process." Arguably, without these two fundamental require-
ments, there is no "process" being afforded the inmate. The
guarantees of notice and hearing to Ohio inmates were very
important to justice O'Connor's determination of the case. She
reasoned that the "process [Woodard] received, including
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to participate
in an interview, comports with ... whatever limitations the
Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings:"
It is not at all clear that she would have found Due Process sat-
isfied in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Based on this, counsel could argue that because Virginia does
not provide these fundamental requirements of Due Process,
its clemency process violates the FourteenthAmendment.
Summary and analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
process: Woodard, 1998WL 129931,at*10 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in
part & concurring in the judgment). SimilarlyJustice Stevens expressed
the belief that a denial of clemency which resulted from "procedures
infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or the deliberate fab-
rication of false evidence"would be constitutionally unacceptable.Id at
*11 (Stevens,J, concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Additionally, if there was evidence that Virginia's clemency
process operated in a racially discriminatory manner, an inmate
may have an Equal Protection claim.As Justice Stevens stated in
Woodard, "no one would contend that a governor could ignore
the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, reli-
gion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying
clemency' Woodard, 1998WL 129931, at "12 (Stevens,J., concur-
ring in part & dissenting in part).
2See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
'Woodard, 1998WL 129931, at *11 (O'ConnorJ., concurring
in part & concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
BEAVERS v. PRUETT
1997 WIL 585739 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997)'
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the night of May 1, 1990Thomas H. Beavers,Jr. broke
into the home of a sixty year-old widow named Marguerite
Lowery. Beavers subsequently raped and murdered Ms.
Lowery by smothering her with a pillow. Beavers was con-
'This is an unpublished disposition which is referenced in the
"Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" at 125 E3d 847
(4th Cir. 1997).
'Beavers v.Pruett, 1997WL 585739,at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23,1997).
victed of capital murder and sentenced to death 3 based on the
"future dangerousness" aggravator.4 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed on direct appeal and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.' Beavers then filed a state habeas peti-
3Beavers, 1997WL 585739, at *1. Beavers was also convicted
of rape, grand larceny, and arson and was sentenced to life, ten
years, and eight years respectively on those counts. Id. at *1 n.3.
'Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
'Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411, cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993).
